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Glossary of non-English Words 
 
Anjuman: Islamic organizations and associations 
Arya Samaj: Hindu revivalist society established in mid 19
th
 century. They considered the 
Vedas as the only sources of truth in Hinduism. 
Ashraf: upper class Muslims with a Persion, Afghan or Arabic lineage 
Atrap: lower class Muslim converts in India 
Bhadralok: English Educated Bengali with a taste for European culture and lifestyle  
Brahmin: priest class Hindu in the caste system  
Dharma: religion; but originally used as law that governs the universe  
Farai’di movement: Islamic revivalist movement in East Bengal in the 19th century    
Gauraksha Sabha: cow protection society 
Jotedar: caretaker class for Zamindars; landowners with medium holdings  
Madrassa: Islamic school 
Mahishya: Sub-caste in the region of Bengal  
Maulvi: Islamic scholar, one who completed education in a madrassa 
Mofussil: the provincial or rural districts of India 
Namasudra: Sudra sub-caste in Barisal region of Bengal 
Panchayet: village council consisting of five members 
Pir: Islamic holy man generally associated with Sufism. 
Raiyat: tenant farmer 
Sabha: assembly or association 
Samiti: committee, trustee or association 
Shuddhi: purification; conversion to Hinduism 
Sudras: peasant class Hindu in the caste system 
Swadeshi: translated self or own country; movement of economic resistance to the British 
Raj only purchasing and using Indian or home grown goods   
Swami: Hindu ascetic and teacher 
Tabligh: propagation of the message of Islam; conversion to Islam 
Ulema: Islamic cleric and legal scholar 
Zamindar: landowner, usually with aristocratic lineage  
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INTRODUCTION 
Why is the communal discourse in modern South Asian history primarily framed 
by the religious conflicts and identity politics between Hindus and Muslims? It is 
inaccurate to claim that Hindus and Muslims were people perennially antagonistic toward 
one another and that communal violence spawned from the innate tension that laid its 
mark on the 20
th
 century South Asian history. While contemporary historians have 
refuted this primordial supposition illustrating religious identities of Hindus and Muslims, 
it still demonstrates strong resilience in continuing to explain instances of violence.
1
 
Needless to say, these religious identities are fluid social constructions. The leaders of 
India utilized religious symbols to construct and consolidate their group identities and 
interests. However, this is not the only way to achieve group solidarity. Frequently, 
grassroots and popular movements enable group cohesion and recreate new social 
perceptions that can challenge the dominant nationalist historiography. The subaltern 
historiography of South Asian history is a representation of this latter phenomenon, 
whereas the former postulation exemplified nationalist historiography.
2
 
Patricia Gossman argues that the instances of communal outbreak were 
manipulated by Hindu and Muslim leaders for political purpose. “The communal riots 
that marked the pre-partition period in Bengal were not the inevitable result of 
                                                 
1
 Gyanandra Pandey has done substantial work in this field, see his, The Construction of 
Communalism in Colonial North India, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), 27-65. 
2
 See Sanjukta Das Gupta’s Peasant and Tribal Movements in Colonial Bengal: a historiographic 
overview in Rethinking Bengal Historiography, (New Delhi : Manohar Publishers & 
Distributors : International Centre for Bengal Studies, 2001), & Ranjit Guha’s On some of Aspects of 
Historiography of Colonial India, Selected Subaltern Studies, edited by Ranajit Guha and Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak, Ranajit, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988), 37-44. 
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constitutional changes that redefined the balance of power between Hindus and 
Muslims”.3 These instances of violence began to capture the idea of an imagined 
community. The leaders needed to find a way to energize their respective religious 
communities by supplying threats to them by identifying the “other”. They did it to create 
their political base so that they could rally support when needed. Even the British 
authorities explained that these episodes of religious violence qualified as being 
communal. In fact, they propagated the idea of separate religious categories in the census 
in 1901. The British labeled each person and every household in Bengal and throughout 
greater India to be a part of one or another religious group. By doing so, they officially 
validated the claim of the elite leaderships of the Hindus and Muslims that they declared 
that Hindus and Muslims were different, separate, and distinct communities. Therefore, 
they needed to be treated legislatively and judicially as such. The cow protection 
movement, a religious revivalist movement of reformist Hindus of the late 19
th
 century 
was effective in fostering communal distinctions anew. However, it would be 
disingenuous to attribute to the movement historicity of communality. Cow protection 
riots in Bengal were sporadic in nature and local leaders and politicians were only 
partially effective in utilizing it for political purposes. The political systems of the 19
th
 
century were much more parochial than of the 20
th
 century. Moreover, mass mobilization 
by Gandhi would come several decades later.   
While the peasant identity vacillated under the rhetoric of religious propaganda, it 
continued to assert itself in times of socio-economic strife. Nonetheless, a narrative of 
violence threatened the community. Local leaders were effective in drawing differences 
                                                 
3
 Patricia Gossman, Riots and Victims: Violence and the Contruction of Communal Identity among 
Bengali Muslims, 1905-1947, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), 8. 
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during moments of both social and ideological crisis. The cow protection movement was 
a crucial movement; it was used as a unifying tool that transcended class, caste systems 
and regional boundaries. The movement emphasized the religious differences of Hindus 
and Muslims. Early communal conflicts, such as the cow protection movement, became 
effective tools for political mobilization because they cut “cleavages across rural relations 
and derived communal solidarity against threatened aggression”.4 
With memories of the Sepoy Mutiny fresh in the minds of the British 
administration, they felt threatened by the cow protection movement. They thought it had 
the potential to become a mass movement that could attract large portions of the Indian 
population. Therefore, they wanted to control it by setting rules and procedures to prevent 
a unified opposition against the government. Queen Victoria acknowledged the threat 
posed by the movement in a letter to Viceroy Lord Lansdowne, “The Queen greatly 
admired the Viceroy’s speech on the cow-killing agitation. While she quite agrees in the 
necessity of perfect fairness, she thinks the Muhammadans do require more protection 
than Hindus, and they are decidedly by far more loyal. She thought the Muhammadan’s 
cow-killing is made the pretext for the agitation, it is, in fact, directed against us, who kill 
far more cows for our army than the Muhammadans”.5 The Queen’s statement captures a 
fundamental aspect of British policy during this period. She acknowledges that there 
existed a grave potential for the Indian masses to unite under cow protection since it was 
not even mandatory for Muslims to slaughter cows for Bakr-id. As a result, the British 
chose to emphasize empowering Muslim communities in order to balance the dominance 
                                                 
4
 Gossman, Riots and Victims, 8. 
5
 T. M. Dharampul, The British Origin of Cow Slaughter in India, 1880-1894. (Mussoorie: Society for 
Integrated Development of Himalayas, 2002), 69. 
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of Hindus in politics. This has been characterized as the British divide and rule tactic, 
employed to disrupt the communal cohesion of India. 
Overall British policy in relations to the indigenous population of India was also 
shifting around this time. During the 1880’s the Hindu elites were becoming politically 
conscious and were demanding representation in government under the auspices of the 
Indian National Congress. Simultaneously, Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan was a strong 
advocate for empowering of the Muslim people, who constituted a large minority in 
Northern India.
6
 After the Age of Consent agitation in 1891, the British were looking for 
ways to obstruct the Hindu opposition by bringing the Muslims into the public arena.  
At the end of the 19th century, before the first partition of Bengal in 1905, there 
was the beginning of the Hindu and Muslim formulations as socio-political categories. It 
was the consequence of three movements. They are the religious revivalism in the 
countryside by both the Hindus and Muslims, the communal orientation of the census and 
legal system by the British, and the rise of elite politics – to mobilize or manage the 
diverse groups of Bengal. The convergence of these three developments in the 
countryside produced mass movements and riots tinged by communal colors under the 
aegis of cow protection. The riots that ensued displayed brief manifestations of a new 
kind of politics based on religious identity that was gaining ground in India.     
In the following sections, I first discuss the salient features of communalism in 
Bengal. Then, I address the changing social relations in the countryside under British 
laws that enabled the cow protection movement to be successful because it brought 
together local elites at religious centers. Afterwards, I move on to the birth of the cow 
                                                 
6
 C. H. Philips, The Evolution of India and Pakistan. (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 178. 
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protection movement by the grassroots activism of the Arya Samaj and explicate the 
subsequent Muslim and British reactions. Given that, the British feared the possibility of 
communal unity, they did their utmost to halt such cohesion in order to preserve the Raj 
from internal threats. Finally, I examine instances of communal riots resulting from the 
cow activism and its ramifications for the construction of a Hindu and Muslim identity 
that dominated the 20
th
 century nationalist politics.  
 
COMMUNALISM IN THE BENGAL CONTEXT 
Two types of violence characterized the rural countryside in the colonial period. 
First was the insurgent violence resulting from peasant uprisings and labor revolts, and 
the other was communal violence.
7
 The former stemmed from economic hardships, while 
the latter derived from cultural clashes, prompted through the manipulation of religious 
symbols and institutions by interest groups. The sectarian violence that erupted 
throughout India in the 1930s and 1940s was a conflation of the two types of violence.
8
 
However, prior to the first Bengal partition, there were few instances of violence, given 
the status of Hindu-Muslim relations in the 1890s. One such instance was advent of the 
cow protection movement, which exemplified early stirrings of 20
th
 century 
communalism. 
                                                 
7
 Gossman, Riots and Victims, 12.  
8
 Joya Chatterjee has written comprehensively about the communal violence in the decades before 
Partition, see her work, Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932-1947, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 150-190. 
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Ranajit Guha highlights that colonial elite’s mobilization of the subaltern did not 
align with their anti-imperial objectives.
9
 Nevertheless, the elite saw the necessity to 
engage in mass politics and needed to incorporate the subaltern into their agenda. 
Politicians utilized hostilities within and among communities to mobilize the masses. 
Many times, the local elites and landed magnates took advantage of existing grievances 
in the countryside and gave them a communal color. This way they were able to integrate 
local politics into the grand narratives of separate communities in India. The cow 
protection movement embodied the process because it was a manifestation of communal 
politics driven by, to a limited extent, elite interests combined with peasant unrest. The 
cow protection movement spread to the urban centers of Bombay, Benares and Calcutta 
but it aggressively spread to the countryside by powerful and polemical itinerants 
transforming religion into a socio-political issue.
10
 The movement resulted in politicizing 
religious identities in rural areas.      
The membership of ethnic or religious communities is too often assumed to be 
monolithic in character but it always consists of disparate sects. How the sects negotiated 
their position within the larger Hindu or Muslim community depended on culture and 
politics.  Nevertheless, the fissiparous tendencies of a group are often a threat to its 
cohesion. At the turn of the 19th century, there were clear and visible signs of shifting 
social relations and consequent creation of new social categories in rural and suburban 
Bengal.
11
 It should also be noted that Muslims in South Asia were never a unified group. 
                                                 
9
 Guha & Spivak, Selected Subaltern Studies: Introduction, 3-31. 
10
 Dharampul, The British Origin of Cow Slaughter, 93. 
11
 Rajat Kanta Ray, Social Conflict and Political Unrest in Bengal 1875-1927, (Delhi, India: Oxford 
University Press, 1984), 44-65. 
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The Muslims were a diverse community. They not only differed by regional, cultural and 
linguistic variations, but also Muslims of India followed a wide range of purist and 
syncretic rituals of Islam. There were sharp distinctions between Bengali Muslims and 
their Uttar Pradeshi or Punjabi counterparts. In fact, even within Bengal there were 
substantial differences between the ashraf and atrap classes of Muslims. These kinds of 
differences of class and caste were even more pronounced in the Hindu community. 
Separated by castes and sub-castes, the Hindu caste identity epitomized different 
communities and what each of those identities strictly adhered to boundaries that 
distinguished them, i.e. Brahmins could not cohabitate with Sudras. In the villages, caste 
identity was still a powerful force in social organization.   
Asim Roy demonstrates that the cultural intermediaries like the local saints, pirs, 
and swamis played a critical role in creating a syncretic tradition among majority of 
peasant Muslims in rural societies of Bengal.
12
 The general consensus among scholars is 
that Bengali Muslims were not politically aroused before the first partition of Bengal, 
although Bengali Hindus were far ahead in mobilizing through religious identity.
13
 
Between 1905-1911, Bengal remained partitioned as a consequence of the British act, the 
cleavage between the Hindus and the Muslims became sharper as the result of violent 
mobilizations and demonstrations under the swadeshi movement, which protested against 
the vivisection of Bengal through empowering indigenous culture and economy.
14
  
                                                 
12
 Asim Roy demonstrated the migration of Islam and the development of syncretic culture among 
various Muslim and Hindu communities, see Islamic Syncretistic Tradition in Bengal, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983), 59-83. 
13
 Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims, 132. 
14
 Sumit Sarkar, Modern India, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), 
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The idea of the two separate religious communities originated with Orientalist 
historiography of India. The early scholarly works by Europeans such as Max Muller 
divided the history of India in three distinct periods. Ancient India was characterized by 
Hindu rule; the medieval period in India began with the Muslim conquest, and British 
rule in India was considered the modern era.
15
 The British did not create the construction 
of communality; they merely codified it with historiography, and then through the legal 
system. Gyanendra Pandey defines communalism as “a form of colonialist knowledge” 
that defined a primitive behavior characterized by religious bigotry and irrationality that 
the British thought was endemic to India.
16
  This is the logic behind British jurisprudence 
and the historiography of the British policy to “divide and rule”. Because of the inherent 
assumption of separate religious communities, British policies, as we shall see, 
encouraged communal behavior. 
The nationalist historiography emphasizes the role of the educated bhadraloks and 
zamindars in constitutional politics.
17
 They used religious ideas and symbols to mobilize 
rural support for their political interests. The result of elite politics was the creation of 
communal divisions and subsequent outbursts of violent riots. However, the subaltern 
collective argues that most communal incidents were not simply manipulated by elites for 
the systematic construction of identity. In fact there were legitimate complaints and their 
manifestation was strategically utilized by the elites. The subaltern historiography 
highlights anti-imperialist protests and other popular uprisings that were not governed by 
                                                 
15
 Gyanendra Pandey, "Questions of Nationalism and Communalism," Economic and Political Weekly 
(1987): 983-984. 
16
 Gossman, Riots and Victims, 11. 
17
 Brian A. Hatcher, Great men waking: paradigms in the historiography of the Bengal Renaissance in 
Rethinking Bengal: Essays in Historiography, New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2001.  
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the manipulation of symbols by the elite.
18
 The Faraidi Movement of the late 19
th
 century 
and the Namasudra activism in the early 20
th
 century are two examples of anti-imperial 
subaltern movements.
19
 These were local uprisings, which became incorporated into the 
grand narratives of Muslims and Hindus, respectively. In this paper, I explain that peasant 
agency was undermined in the cow protection movement as it was incorporated in the 
larger dichotomy of Hindu-Muslim social categories. It was first sustained by religious 
revivalist movements of the 19
th
 century and by electoral politics in the 20
th
 century. 
However in the 1890s, politics in Bengal still remained local. The affluent families in the 
countryside were the dominant force in infusing urban movements such as the cow 
protection with rural politics. As a result, they were transforming peasant unrests into 
communal conflicts.      
 
ON THE STRUCTURE OF PEASANT SOCIETY 
By the end of the 19
th
 century, the economic structures of the countryside were 
rapidly changing, which acted in conjunction with religious reforms and electoral politics. 
This occurred primarily as a result of the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885. It was a land 
redistribution scheme. The act enabled the creation of a prosperous jotedar class. They 
held medium to large tracts of land but were subsidiary to the landed magnates and 
aristocrats. This new class of people became politically influential and social mediators in 
                                                 
18
 Guha & Spivak, Selected Subaltern Studies: Introduction, 3-31 
19
 Ray, Social Conflict and Political Unrest, 74-9; also see Muin-uddin Ahmed Khan’s History of 
Fara’idi Movement in Bengal, 1818-1906, (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1965), 25-31, 43-44, 
104-123;  & Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, Caste, Protest & Identity in Colonial India: The Namasudras of 
Bengal, 1872-1947,(Richmond, UK: Curzon Press, 1997), 61-135 for a detailed account of each 
movement. 
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the countryside. They also had political aspirations at the local community level in 
winning district board elections. They gave financial support to the Hindu sabhas and 
Muslim anjumans. Thereby, the jotedars were able to marry their political aspirations 
with the reform agendas of local religious leaders. It enabled the politicization of Hindu 
and Muslim identities. Ultimately, economic changes of rural Bengal stemming from 
Bengal Tenancy Act transformed the socio-religious atmosphere in which cow protection 
and its consequent communal riots could take place.     
Sympathetic legislators wrote the tenancy act to help poor and landless peasants 
acquire land. The act classified proprietors of land in three categories: tenure-holders and 
under-tenure holders, occupancy and non-occupancy tenants, and under tenants.
20
 
Surendranath Banerjee’s Indian Association and Ameer Ali’s Central National 
Mohammedan Association supported the act as a positive step toward empowering the 
depressed classes.
21
 The sense of communal identity that took root with cow protection 
movement in rural Bengal could not happen without the restructuring of peasant relations 
and it occurred through the land redistribution initiative under the auspices of the Bengal 
Tenancy Act of 1885. 
The Bengal Tenancy Act validated raiyats right to occupancy of the land if they 
could prove occupancy for the previous twelve years. While the act attempted to resolve 
the deficiencies of the previous 1859 Act, it did little to address the problem of 
sharecroppers. After 1885, the numbers of sharecroppers outpaced any other rural 
agrarian demographic category. The law assumed that there was only one raiyat for an 
                                                 
20
 Ray, Social Conflict and Political Unrest, 53-54. 
21
 Leonard A. Gordan, Bengal: The Nationalist Movement, 1876-1940, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1974), 31. 
 Alam 14 
 
occupancy holding, which in reality was far from the truth. In many cases dealing with 
large holdings, it became very difficult to determine which raiyat had occupancy rights to 
which part of the holding since they may have worked on a different plot each year. 
Multiple raiyats may have customary rights to the same plot of land.
22
 Rajat Kanta Ray 
points out that the greatest beneficiary of the 1885 Act were the jotedars. They were 
affluent cultivators with occupancy rights over their large holdings. They were able to 
expand their holding by collaborating with moneylenders who annexed the land from 
their indebted raiyats who had proven occupancy over their land. In this way, “the 
increase in land transfers, and consequently, the increase in landless labor and 
sharecroppers in the first half of the twentieth century were attributable” to the land 
reorganization scheme of the Tenancy Act of 1885.
23
 
In general, the relationship between the zamindars and raiyats were tense and 
unfriendly. There is an important distinction that Rafiuddin Ahmed makes about the 
demographic constituency of Bengal’s rural population. While most of the zamindars 
were Hindu, there were also Muslim zamindars who exploited their Hindu and Muslim 
raiyats indiscriminately. Similarly, there were many Hindu raiyats but their narrative 
follows a different trajectory from that of the Muslim raiyats. As the forbearers of rural 
traditions, the zamindars and raiyats were the people most likely to be emboldened by 
religious revivalist movements. In response to cow protection, some zamindars objected 
to cow sacrifice in their lands. Similarly, the raiyats began to object to paying fees for 
Kali puja and other idolatrous activities. Gossman argues that Muslims anjumans 
particularly conflated economic disparities and animosities with religious divisions in 
                                                 
22
 Ray, Social Conflict and Political Unrest, 54. 
23
 Gossman, Riots and Victims, 31.  
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order to raise their status in the community for political power and position.
24
 This was 
true in the 20
th
 century at the height of the nationalist period, when communalism and 
violence took a turn for the worse. However, conditions were less volatile in the 1890’s. 
With the land redistribution executed by the Bengal Tenancy Act, the rural social 
structure was undergoing substantial transformation. Moreover, the fragmented 
peripheries were not immune to the socio-political and religious transformation sweeping 
through the urban areas. Unlike the urban centers, which had become politically charged 
and filled with clamorous voices of elite demands and interests, the politics of the rural 
countryside remained insular until the end of the 19
th
 century. New forms of community 
organizations based on religious revivalism were emerging as pan-religious movements 
began to seep into the countryside.  
The anjumans for the Muslims and sabhas among lower caste Hindus were 
creating cleavages in local and village boundaries. The sponsors behind these institutions 
were rich local families who benefited from the land distribution and began to take an 
active role in their local communities and politics. The affluent families of the locality 
competed for political power by vying for positions in municipal and district boards. The 
most aggressive and successful of these vested special interest groups were some 
ambitious Muslims, Mahishya and Namasudra caste groups.
25
 Their activities contributed 
to a heightened consciousness of the social position among the peasants and tied them to 
the larger imagined communities.  
The formation of anjuman in the countryside was the product of the patronage of 
rich Muslim families. This group wanted to curb the power of their overseeing landlords, 
                                                 
24
 Gossman, Riots and Victims, 32. 
25
 Ray, Social Conflict and Political Unrest, 71. 
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most of whom where absentee landlords; and they also sought to reduce government 
interference in collecting taxes and tribute. In order to do so, they endeavored to expand 
their political influence by capturing local and union boards. They collaborated with the 
local ulema and maulvis for political mobilization and Islamization of the peasantry. The 
local anjumans were dependent on the contribution of the rich jotedars who provided the 
funds for the operation of the local madrassas and mosques. The maulvis augmented the 
propagation of orthodox Islamic teachings to ignorant peasants. Their awareness 
campaign was effective in serving the interests of the jotedars. This allowed the 
community not only to become more religiously aware but ushered unity among rural 
Muslim peasants.
26
 The funds of the anjumans were generated from student tuition in 
madrassas, price of leather from sacrificed animals and revenue from anjuman owned 
and operated bazaars. They also raised funds from membership subscription and grains 
donated by peasants.
27
 
Meanwhile, the British efforts to quantify the demography of their Indian empire 
were critical in dragging the countryside into the murky waters of identity politics. The 
first census in Bengal was conducted in 1872. Since the census operations contributed to 
the codification of fluid social categories by forcing people to consciously identify with a 
community, it demarcated religion —Hindus and Muslims— as the fundamental category 
for understanding the demographic composition of Bengal and India at large. Benedict 
Anderson elucidates the role of census in creating the national identity; however in the 
case of Bengal, the process followed a similar trajectory in constructing communal 
                                                 
26
 Ray, Social Conflict and Political Unrest, 74. 
27
 Ray, Social Conflict and Political Unrest, 74. 
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identities through the modern bureaucratic institutions of the British Raj.
28
 Peasants were 
suspicious of the early census officials because they feared government intended to 
record demographic data in order to raise taxes on the poor. In some instances they even 
caused riots to obstruct the administration of the census. By 1901, the population of 
Bengal exceeded 78 million while it was nearly 300 million for all of India. The number 
of officials required “to carry out the census in 1901 was more than 400,000” which 
demonstrated the magnitude of personnel needed to conduct it.
29
 The census process 
connected local leaders with urban intellectuals and movements as ideas and 
subsequently the politics of communal separation spread to the countryside. In effect, it 
began transforming rural identities by integrating them with urban ones. 
Rafiuddin Ahmed shows the Islamization of rural Muslims in Bengal by the 
upward trend of social identification of the lower classes. They used the census to gain 
entry into the more respectable groups of society by changing their names or adding titles 
to their names to indicate their ancestral lineage to Islamic emigrants. In 1872, the 
number of people in Bengal, including in Sylhet and Cachar, with Muslims titles was 
266,378, of which 232,189 were Shaikhs, 9,858 Syeds and 2,206 Mughals. By 1901, the 
number of Sheikhs alone inflated to 19,527,221 when the total Muslim population of 
Bengal was slightly over twenty five million. The census began a trend of association by 
title to uplift one’s social position.30As it turns out, the census had a similar affect on the 
Hindu caste identities.  
                                                 
28
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 
(New York: Verso, 1883), Chap 10. 
29
 Gordan, Bengal: The Nationalist Movement, 36. 
30
 Rafiuddin Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims 1871-1905, ( Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988), 115. 
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Coinciding with the pan-Islamic revival, the British policies also garnered lower 
caste movements. In the 1901 census, the British government tried to establish a 
hierarchy of caste structure. The process rapidly turned for the worse as people were 
politicking for better caste positions and higher status while others, in the process, were 
denigrated to lower social statuses. In a demonstration of excess power, the British had 
politicized caste identity. Sir Herbert Risley, who was in charge of conducting the census, 
wanted to systematically rationalize the social structure of Hindus. In doing so, he 
formally codified it in the form of the census. This prompted caste associations to evolve 
along new principles and leadership.
31
 Traditional local enclaves at the village level were 
known as samaj. However, an alternate form of association called sabha or samiti was 
nascent during this period. These were voluntary associations but unlike the samaj, these 
were not based on caste and locality alone. Modeled after European associations, they 
claimed to represent a caste group in its entirety – not only specific geographical sub-
castes – with the intention of improving the social position of their caste group. The 
movement was combining and unifying caste groups in a radically modern way, by 
giving it numeric and demographic advantages for agitation. The sabhas or samitis were 
generally centralized in Calcutta with branches in the countryside seeing as their 
leadership was frequently English educated lawyers and bureaucrats.
32
 
Even though it was formed for the benefit of the total caste, members used it to 
advance their personal standing in the caste and society at large. It became a vehicle for 
the rich and affluent. However, they also connected rural communities with the wider 
British Empire. Consequently, the sabhas undermined the traditional leaderships of the 
                                                 
31
 Ray, Social Conflict and Political Unrest, 42. 
32
 Ray, Social Conflict and Political Unrest, 43. 
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samaj (samajpatis) and furthered the vested interests of urban society. The redefinition of 
caste and community organizations through sabhas enabled the mobilization of rural 
caste members for political support. But this sort of self-proclaimed identification 
alienated non-caste members. In short, the anjuman and sabhas received patronage from 
the jotedars, who became prosperous and influential through the land re-distribution of 
the Bengal Tenancy Act.
33
 The patrons of the local anjumans and sabhas worked with the 
religious leaders to enhance their social status in order to acquire the coveted positions in 
the local community and on district boards. These patrons became the glue connecting 
the urban and rural societies at the turn of the century.   
Rajat Kanta Ray dates the emergence of sabhas with the turn of the century but I 
contend that associations were in the making even before then.
34
 The gauraksha sabhas 
established for the protection of the cow among Hindus were exemplary of the earliest 
associations. They were voluntary and not confined by caste relations. In fact, Swami 
Dayananda, who was one of the movement’s principal leaders, was also founder of the 
Arya Samaj, which rejected the caste system in Hindu dharma entirely. 
 Peasant mobilization was not limited to the activities of the rural anjumans and 
sabhas. There were other notable socio-political developments in the urban spheres to 
incorporate the peasantry. Throughout the 1880’s, both The Indian Association and 
Central National Mohammedan Association supported the Bengal Tenancy Act as their 
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community development work was closely tied with peasant movements.
35
 The Indian 
Association was engaged in grassroots activism with the aim of empowering the 
conditions of the lower caste groups.
36
 They later became the Bengali arm of the 
Congress for rural mobilization. The Central national Mohammedan Association was 
active in similar work of uplifting the Muslims of India. Its founder, Ameer Ali, believed 
that Muslims of India ought to be united as a homogeneous community.
37
 The mobilizing 
efforts of these organizations also disrupted the power relations of the countryside. They 
collaborated with locally influential peasants, jotedars, who were becoming politically 
and socially active. While their activities were entirely socio-political in nature, their 
focus on specific religious groups, lower castes and Muslims, were vital to raising 
communal consciousness.  
In the 1890s, electoral politics were in its nascent stages. Viceroy Lord 
Lansdowne expressed his concerns in his address to the Bengal Legislative Council in 
1893 about the region’s lack of a democratic tradition, “in many parts of India, any 
system of election is entirely foreign to the feelings and habits of the people”.38 The 
British did not know how the people would react to this peculiar system in India. When 
the electoral process was opened to the district and municipal boards for political 
contention, it attracted the local notables into politics. Gossman argues that it is these 
petty politicians who in close collaboration with the local anjumans and sabhas 
established their electoral constituents by espousing the religious differences. In the 
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process, they fanned the embering flames of communal tensions. This phenomenon was 
pervasive in the 20
th
 century; however, in the 1890s, electoral politics were merely 
burgeoning. Politicians were not mobilizing for mass support. Their agenda was limited 
to local elections. The Indian Council Act of 1892 established the first elected seats for 
native Indians in the Bengali Legislative Council, which held its first election in the 
following year.
39
 Throughout the electoral transformation of Bengal, what we observe is 
that the cow was used as a symbol of religious piety for competitions in elections and 
attaining social power. Thus electoral politics sparked communal tensions by utilizing the 
cow protection movement – to which we now turn.  
  
EMERGENCE OF COW PROTECTION 
In the 19
th
 century, movements of religious awareness or revivalism were 
ephemeral, but in its final decades, Hindus were becoming organized along religious lines. 
Sacred symbols were used to mobilize the masses. Under the auspices of devotional 
practices over the cow, politics and cosmology intermingled. The symbol of the cow, as 
the venerated mother and nurturer of India, was not restricted by geography, language or 
caste. Therefore, it was transformed into a powerful tool for communal mobilization 
across the country.
40
 
The origin of the cow protection movement can be traced to Swami Dayananda’s 
Arya Samaj, which was a Hindu revivalist organization with the mission to purify the 
decadent practices of the dharma and return to the teachings of the Vedas. Dedicated to 
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both Aryas and non-Aryas, he extrapolated the veneration of the cow as the lifeblood of 
Indian society in his treatise gaurakunanidhi (Ocean of Mercy to the Cow) in 1881 and, 
in the following year, sought to establish a gauraksha sabha (cow protection society).
 41
 
It started a vigorous movement against cow slaughter. The anti-cow killing movement 
began in Punjab. It quickly spread throughout northern India in the 1880’s and reached 
Bengal later in the decade. The movement frequently brought riots and violence in its 
wake. There were traveling itinerants who spread the message about the venerable cow as 
the source of the life in India through lectures, cartoons and pamphlets in villages and 
local fairs. The message condemned anyone who strayed from the principles outlined by 
the preachers. One such pamphlet distributed in Faridpur in 1895 warned low caste 
Hindus that they must restrain themselves from selling cows to Muslims despite having 
heavy financial burdens. A Punjabi newspaper rebutted to the preachers’ message and 
commented on the riots in Rohtak, “the cow slaughter has been practiced in India ever 
since the Mohammedan conquest and that the present agitation in favor of the 
preservation of [the cow] is due to the preaching of the Aryas, who go about exciting 
feelings of the Hindus”.42 The newspaper condemned the movement as essentially a 
mouthpiece for orthodox Hindus.  
Despite Muslim criticism, the Arya Samaj was a reformist Hindu organization. It 
sharply reacted to contemporary Hindu practices of idolatry, polytheism, child marriage, 
dominance of Brahmans and caste system. What the samaj promoted was a return to the 
original teachings of the Vedas and proclaimed the supreme authority of the ancient texts. 
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Therefore, even though the Arya Samaj, with its pan-Hindu revivalist agenda was in 
conflict with the orthodox Hindu associations, it found common ground with the 
orthodox Hindus for the “defense of the Hindu nation” in the cow protection cause.43 
The openness and reformist character of the samaj morphed into orthodox 
militancy that trumpeted religious purification. Indian census data demonstrates this point. 
The 1891 census dramatically underscored Christian successes in converting Punjabi 
outcastes. With a 410% increase in ‘native’ Christians during the last decade, even the 
most confidant Aryas felt a renewal of the “Christian threat”.44 This is an illustration of 
how the census data was changing socio-political relations and fueling religious 
revivalism. In response to the census and to the proselytizing activities of Christian 
missionaries, the samaj was determined to regain the number of converted Hindus from 
the foreign religion. The “Shuddhi movement countered Christian missionaries’ 
aggressive evangelicalism and Muslims’ ‘tabligh” with proselytizing initiatives of its 
own.
45
 It confirmed the Hindu fears that Hindu nation was threatened, much like the 
religious rhetoric of the Muslim ulema in their pan-Islamic movement. Lala Lajpat Rai 
warned people to be conscious about the work of Christian missionaries who with the 
help of the British government were “collecting helpless children and converting them 
into its faith”.46 His comment only demonstrated the heightened consciousness of the 
people’s religious beliefs and identities. 
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As a result, the gauraksha sabhas found support from Hindus from various walks 
of life. Information gathered from police investigations showed it was so appealing, the 
movement rapidly spread from Punjab to throughout northern India within a decade. It 
drew support from prominent community leaders such as landowners, government 
officials, teachers, bankers, and businessmen to finance its operations.
47
 Cow protection 
became a common cause for many Hindus to re-assert their old religious rights, which 
particularly included the zamindars.  Sir Anthony MacDonnell, officiating Lt. Governor 
of Bengal, observed that the agitation could not have the successes as it did without the 
ardent support of the landlords, and it would “not countenanced the unruly spirit which 
has shown itself”.48 The Muslim newspaper sudhakar published the names of zamindars 
in Bengal who tried to thwart their Muslim tenants from sacrificing cows on their 
property. They were Raja of Bhawal, Babus of Bhagyakul, Zamindars of Vikrampuur, 
Kagmari and Muktagacha in Mymensingh, Narail in Jessore.
49
 
There were numerous cases where Hindu zamindars forbade their Muslim tenants 
to sacrifice cows on their land countering the customs of Islamic religious observances. 
In 1895, a commissioner of Rajshahi observed that the Hindu zamindars were trying to 
prevent their tenants from killing cows.
50
 In response to one zamindari encroachment, 
Khalilur Rahman, a local maulvi, “held a number of gatherings at which he delivered 
angry sermons against Hindu persecution. The poor Muslims serving Hindu families, 
about 297 in number, were induced to leave the service of Hindus and to earn a living in 
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manufacture and shop-keeping”.51 However, as we will see later, the movement of 
peasant labor in the mills and industries transformed communal relations in those spaces 
to negotiate their inclusion in the group identity.  
It should be noted that both Hindu and Muslim peasants, regardless of religion, 
continued to band together to resist exploitation by the landlords. This is one way the line 
delineating the communal identity acquired permeability and cross-communication and 
harmony was nevertheless observed depending on the grievance. Many times, the rural 
socio-economic grievances were framed along religious lines for political purposes. A 
sound illustration of this is the land question.
52
 The exploitative landowners and 
oppressed tenants were represented in both Hindu and Muslim communities but the 
distinct categories of Hindu zamindars and Muslim raiyats were made to emphasize the 
disparity in the ratio of landowner and peasants in each of the two religious communities. 
There were more Hindu zamindars than Muslims while the number of impoverished 
raiyats was distributed rather even between Hindus and Muslims. The census data shows 
that in 1901, there were 1,076,361 Hindu landowners and 27,601,346 tenants, whereas 
Muslim landowners numbered 432,236 and tenants 19,653,115.
53
 While Hindu peasants 
still outnumbered Muslims, the local anjumans did not hesitate to conflate the Muslims 
economic grievances with religious conflicts with their landlords.  
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BRITISH REACTION 
The British were aware of the threatening nature of the cow protection movement. 
They were particularly fearful of the potential for the movement to amalgamate the 
Hindus from various castes and unite them under one banner. D. F. McCracken, 
Officiating General Superintendent of Thagi and Dacoity Department, pointed to “a new 
force [that] has arisen, and in considering the military requirement of the country for the 
preservation of internal order, this force has to be considered as an important factor”.54 
Moreover, the government was suspicious of the Arya Samaj’s activities. Initially, 
Arya Samaj was not a political organization since its goal was to improve the social 
conditions of Hindus. However, its agenda and activities were increasingly becoming 
political. Macdonald was asked at an event at Lala Lajpat Rai’s house, “Government 
unnecessarily considers Arya Samaj as the enemy, though it is engaged in improving the 
condition of the people in social and educational fields.” He replied that, “the natural 
consequences of both these things will be that there will be political awakening among 
the people without which they cannot succeed and they will imbue the people with ideas 
of political freedom”.55 His comments proved to be prophetic as the samaj launched its 
campaign on cow protection. The British were aware of the power of religion as a 
political force against the government and were attentive to its activities. Subsequently, it 
is not unsurprisingly that the Arya Samaj collaborated closely with the Hindu Mahasabha 
at the high noon of nationalist politics in the 20
th
 century. 
The activities of the samaj on the cow protection agitation frightened the regime 
because the samaj and the movement acted as the glue that was unifying the diverse sects 
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of Hindus, potentially against colonial ruler. The British officials identified incitement by 
gauraksha sabhas, cow protection societies, as the source of communal discontent. Sir 
Charles Crosthwaite, Lt. Governor of Uttar Pradesh, pointed out the coercive pressure it 
put on the people that “even well meaning Hindus could not dare to speak against these 
societies for fear of losing not only their popularity but their lives”.56 Crosthwaite 
accused the Hindus and the cow protection societies of being seditious bodies, whereas 
he found the Mohammedans innocent in this process. Despite the Lt. Governor’s 
partiality, he was not wrong in pointing out the ramifications of the aggressive tactics of 
gauraksha sabhas and Hindu itinerant preachers who were changing the geo-politics of 
the countryside. Kimberley, the secretary of state, wrote to Viceroy Lansdowne stating 
that “the letter from Crosthwaite which you sent me shows plainly that gauraksha sabhas 
mean mischief and I am afraid we must look forward to the possibility of very serious 
troubles”.57 The correspondence demonstrates the popularity of cow protection 
movements in Northern India and its subversive implications for the British Raj.  
The British government rightfully recognized the pernicious nature of the 
movement as a “uniting force among the Hindus,” but they also understood that the 
movement would be a point of conflict “between Muslims and Hindus, which was always 
considered a useful instrument for the survival of the British Raj”.58 In fact, the Muslims 
were the primary targets for the cow protection movement because of their practice of 
ritual cow sacrifice. It was a visible and predictable (yearly) ritual so it attracted the 
majority of the cow protection hostilities. In the countryside, Muslim peasants did not 
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have the luxury to eat beef. For most of them, beef was eaten once a year for Bakr-id. 
The attack on the practice also polarized the Muslim community as they felt their religion 
threatened. It began to strengthen communal solidarity among the Muslims. 
However, the British were fearful that with a possible change in cow protection 
rhetoric to target the imperial regime. The Muslims could unite with the Hindus because 
the cow was not required for slaughter for the Muslims. They could sacrifice any four-
legged animal but the cow could be sacrificed by several people together. Most preferred 
the cow because it was a cost effective solution. Nevertheless, many during the period 
made this point not to sacrifice cows in support of communal harmony. Mir Musharraf 
Husain, a Muslim Bengali writer, published Go-jiban in 1888 appealing to abolish cow 
slaughter by reasoning that “even if they [Hindus] profess differing religious beliefs, in 
heart and action they are identical”.59 The Muslim press condemned Husain for his work 
and he was forced to rescind his publication after a lawsuit was brought against him. 
While the Hindus were so aggressive in their cow protection movements, the Muslims 
continued this sacrifice as a political statement to defend their identity and tradition. It 
produced solidarity among Bengali Hindus and Muslims. 
In the rural countryside the conflict over cow protection became an important 
issue for the communal identities. The violence that ensued in the 1890’s in Bengal was 
made possible by the direction of religious identities that dominated the nationalist 
discourse in the 20
th
 century. The British quickly realized that the issue around the cow 
could quickly mobilize people for the political purposes of the Congress. Hence, they 
were skeptical about the true intentions of the agitation. H. J. S. Cotton, Chief Secretary 
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of the Government of Bengal, claimed that “in the manifestations now under notice the 
sentiment is ostensibly religious, but it is readily susceptible to manipulation for other 
ends…the Hindu reverence for the cow is one of the “magazines of physical force on 
which, it has been said, the forward party in Indian politics [i.e. the Congress] might rely 
in their contest with the government; and it would have been unwise in existing 
circumstances to ignore this aspect of the case”.60  
Even though Congress was making friendly gestures to the Muslim community to 
participate in its political agitation, they were silent in the cow-protection controversies in 
1893. As a young organization developing its network, it did not want to alienate its 
Hindu supporters. Congress neither supported nor was it involved in organizing 
gauraksha sabhas but their fear of alienating the Hindus effectively alienated the 
Muslims. The membership of Muslims in Congress was declining after 1893 following 
the Azamgarh incident, which were fierce riots that ensued for months in the Azamgarh 
district of the United Provinces. It was sparked by a controversial decision by a 
magistrate to register Muslims for cow slaughter. The incident made Muslims very 
suspicious of the purpose of the gauraksha sabha. Moreover, Congress made no effective 
attempt to bring alienated Muslims back into the fold following the Azamgarh riots.
61
 
“After the Nagpur session of the Congress in 1891, the gauraksha sabha held a large 
meeting within the Congress pavilion, attended by Congress delegates and other visitors. 
Prominent cow protectionist leaders like Sriman Swami attended the Allahabad Congress 
in 1893, while other prominent Congress leaders like Tilak were closely associated with 
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the local gauraksha sabhas”.62 This estranged the Muslims from Congress politics even 
more.    
As demonstrated, officials in British India were justifiably concerned but they 
were relieved that the focus of the movement was primarily on Muslim ritual sacrifice of 
cows for Bakr-id and not on the British government, who slaughtered far more cows for 
its armies. Earl of Kimberley, the Secretary of State, wrote to Viceroy Lansdowne, “that a 
set off to the gravity of the matter is that this movement [anti-cow-killing riots] makes all 
combinations of the Hindus and Mohammedans impossible and so cuts at the roots of the 
Congress agitation for the formation of a united Indian people who are to force us to 
surrender power into their hands”.63 The Secretary of State understood the improbability 
of unification and mobilization in India’s pluralistic society. Therefore he concluded that 
communal violence was inimical to the political mobilization of the Indian National 
Congress. 
 
CUSTOMS AND INNOVATIONS: ENFORCING THE LAW 
British officials needed to balance caution with authority to address the cow 
protection movement, given its delicate nature and explosive potential. Charles 
Crosthwaite, Lt. Governor of Uttar Pradesh, recommended legislation to counter the anti-
cow killing agitation to Viceroy Lord Lansdowne. He advised the administration to be 
assertive and decisive in dealing with the new challenge presented by the Hindus. 
However, the viceroy had a different opinion. He observed that “ the magnitude of the 
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danger arises from this [movement] that the agitation has supplied the whole of disloyal 
elements to be found in the Indian community with a popular backing which they could 
not have obtained from any other source. The movement is prima facie, a legal and 
blameless one… and cannot be interfered with so long as its operations are ostensibly 
restricted to lawful subjects… I am decidedly opposed to the adoption of Sir Charles 
Crosthwaite’s recommendations for an alternation of the law of conspiracy. This proposal 
is, I am afraid, to see, more or less condemned by the whole of local government”.64 
Viceroy Lansdowne chose to exercise caution in dealing with the cow protection 
movement. He relayed his reproving approach to Kimberley, “Any attempt to raise [the 
issue] would certainly get us into hotter water both in this country and at home”.65 He 
feared a confrontational approach by the government would incite people to unite under 
this issue against them. Nevertheless, the viceroy did intend to impede the movement by 
other means. He outlined an alternate strategy. “There are numerous means to dealing 
with itinerant preachers and with societies as well as supporters and promoters of the 
movement under various clauses of the criminal procedure and Penal Codes and under 
Act of 1861”.66 He wanted to use existing criminal laws and penal code to curtail the 
movement as legislating laws to punish dissidents would only arouse anti-British unrest. 
The British problem was that the activities of the gauraksha sabhas were conducted 
legally so there were no grounds to aggressively restrain the sabhas activities without 
fanning the flames of discontent among the Hindus.  
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In light of existing unrest in Bengal, the British administration ultimately decided 
to avoid giving unwarranted incentives to agitators for anti-British mobilization by 
applying their time-tested policy of status quo. They proposed to enact a law on customs 
and innovations to intercede the movement in order to reduce instances of violence. It 
was “based on the axiom which has generally governed our [British] action where 
questions of religious toleration are involved…that what is customary should be allowed 
to continue and that innovations should not be permitted”.67 As was convention of the 
British, they intended to maintain the existing state of rural traditions. This implied that 
the areas where cow slaughter was traditionally accepted and practiced will be allowed to 
continue but in areas where the practice did not occur, it was forbidden to innovate. In the 
process, the government legalized the controversy of cow protection.   
Queen Victoria also stepped in to give suggestions in favor of procedural 
legalization. In a letter to the Viceroy in 1893, she advised that there needed to be 
arbitration bodies established consisting of “influential and impartial people of both 
religions [who] can lay down rules to avoid these outbreaks and outrages; it is to be 
(hoped?) that much evil may be averted”.68 In accordance with the Queen’s view, the 
government issued a Circular to establish Hindu-Muslim panchayets in villages to 
mediate conflicts in concurrence with the following guiding principles. First, cows should 
be taken to the slaughtering place discretely. Second, cows should not be slaughtered in 
public places or places where it might attract unwarranted attention. Third, shops must 
have licenses to sell beef. Fourth, for sacrificial killings, Muslim household will need to 
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acquire a license from the local magistrate. The law was clear but its application created 
new sets of problems, which led sometimes to violent outbreaks.
69
  
Viceroy Lansdowne expressed his reservations in the effective implementation of 
the guiding principles described in the circular. He recognized the possibility of conflict 
the circular could generate. He appreciated that the first proposal, to take cows to the 
slaughter house discretely, could be very difficult to enforce given that in many places 
there was only one main road. Thus, in his speech on cow-killing in 1893, he 
recommended caution and contemplated ways to modify the rule in order to ensure it did 
not give “Hindus a right of watching the roads, and compelling every passing driver to 
satisfy them that this cattle were not intended for slaughter”.70 He commented that 
proposals two and three should be left in the hands of local officials for rulings. The final 
proposal was the most controversial. Lansdowne thought “any attempt to register and 
substantiate customary rights would not only be impossible in practice, but would 
probably lead to a revival of the excitement” surrounding the cow protection 
movement.
71
 The irony here is that once the law came into force, the problems and 
reservations Lord Lansdowne outlined in his speech became painfully evident. 
Authorities found it difficult to implement and enforce the customs and innovations law 
in unique local contexts. 
The de jure clarity of the law dissolved under specific local cases brought against 
the district courts. Generally, public opinion was favorable to the circular but there were 
angry flare ups over specific interpretations of its clauses. A riot broke out in 
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Murshidabad over the definition of a ‘public road’ in 1895.72 In 1896 in Hughly, the 
cause of the Rishra Serampore cow-killing riot between the Hindus and Muslims of the 
Hastings jute mill was on the disagreement over case of innovation. Muslims in the 
village openly announced their intention to sacrifice a cow for Bakr-id. In response, the 
Hindus submitted a petition to the government. The local magistrate was called upon to 
deliberate whether cow slaughter was customary in the area and he sided with the Hindus. 
Mr. Lister, sub-divisional officer, then arrested eight to ten people who were still 
planning to sacrifice cows at the Rishra Mosque and placed the building under police 
authority.
73
 The Imam of the mosque began to incite Muslims from the surrounding 
villages to mobilize and he also sent a letter to Calcutta for support. On the day of Bakr-
Id, Hindus and Muslims did not go to the mills. It was a tense day as the police was 
patrolling throughout the town and succeeded to prevent any riots from breaking out.   
Lyall, the Secretary of the Government of India, commented on the general 
euphoria over Hindu revivalism and general decline of anglophiles which “in recent years 
have brought about a considerable change, and European habits are no longer paraded as 
they used to be”. 74 It exemplified the change in perception that embodied a new kind of 
politics. Since the fiery debates surrounding the Ilbert Bill, which concerned the right of 
native judges to try Europeans in some cases, the British support among the bhadraloks 
had been wavering.
75
 It only increased the anxiety of the British officials as they openly 
extended their patronage to the Muslims communities. The sense of imperial favoritism, 
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which Sayyid Ahmed Khan was advocating for, exacerbated conflicts between 
communities. It also led to the division between Hindu and Muslim elite interests and the 
Muslim breakaway from Congress. In a cow case in Mirzapur, “the prosecution and 
conviction of Munshi Inderman led to the [Muslims] to believe that the British 
government was on their side. Mr. Dale, the Magistrate, ordered to restore the cow to the 
owner, Akbar Ali Khan, on condition that he should not slaughter it, as it had been 
intended. The Muslim community was visibly dissatisfied. Akbar Ali Khan appealed to 
Dale’s successor, Mr. Cadell who undid Dale’s decision. The High Court did not 
entertain the appeal and Akbar Ali Khan was allowed to slaughter the cow.” The 
Allahabad High Court also, in a case, decided that “every Mohammedan is at liberty to 
kill cattle, but that he has no right to expose beef with the object of offending the feelings 
of Hindus”.76 The second provision was frequently neglected in subsequent disputes. 
  Dipankar Gupta notes that there was communal friction owing to the “two 
communities were now legally equal and in competition over legitimate authority.”77 The 
legal system, as with the ruling on customs and innovations, assessed the issues of the 
two communities uniformly and it resulted in conflating potency of religious rituals and 
practices into one legal domain. Until now, the religious rituals were never evaluated 
under one umbrella of knowledge. By virtue of British sympathies being with cow 
slaughter, the courts frequently ruled in favor of the Muslims. The decision of the 
Allahabad court to protect Muslims’ right to sacrifice cows led them to believe that they 
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had every legal right to kill cows. The legal battles heightened communal tensions and 
were an effective result of British “divide and rule” strategy. 
 
RIOTS, CLASHES AND COMMUNCAL REACTION 
Through the use of religious symbols the masses were manipulated to believe they 
were part of a larger struggle. The elite pressure groups were able to leverage the rural 
base to demand electoral concessions from the British Raj. The anjumans and gauraksha 
sabhas helped paint local disagreements with communal colors. This further emphasized 
the myth that Hindus and Muslims were a historically separate people. The cow 
protection movement would never have generated such intense fervor without the 
religious propaganda of the anjumans and gauraksha sabhas. The interplay of religious 
and political dimensions of the cow protection movement spawned communal conflicts in 
villages and rural regions, particularly in the second half of the 1890’s in Bengal. 
The most ferocious violence over cow-killing occurred around the suburbs of 
Calcutta. The politics and insular attitudes of the city overflowed into the surrounding 
areas. These riots frequently involved mill-hands working the jute or textile factories up 
river from the city. The mills recruited large numbers of people from both Muslim and 
Hindu communities. As a result, mills became the epicenter for violence. However, the 
riots and clashes spilled into the neighboring villages as well.  
The strength of the communal feeling at the time was reflected by three Hindu-
Muslims riots that broke out in 1896 at Titaghur, Garden Reach, and Serampore. The 
riots were spurred by the ongoing issues of cow killing during Bakr-Id. Hindus 
considered the act of killing sacrilege whereas Muslims thought it to be holy ritual. In 
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1896, the Bakr-Id riot of Titaghur began with Mahomed Hossan, an upcountry bricklayer 
working at the construction site of the Stand Jute Mills. While he was bringing his heifer 
for sacrifice, the heifer was stolen by four Hindus who opposed to cow sacrifice for Bakr-
Id. The decision of the district magistrate favored the Hindus and it was construed as 
political favoritism by the Muslims. Therefore, Muslims within the community took a 
keen interest in the case and were upset that Hindus were stealing their property. The 
issue divided the neighboring Titaghur Paper Mills and the Titaghur Jute Mills along 
religious lines. The word spread that at the Titaghur mosque where 300 Muslims 
congregated for the prayer; and a clash between 300 Hindus and 180 Muslims broke out, 
with Muslims calling out to “beat the bloody Hindus”.78 It is surprising that the owner of 
the cow was not involved in the proceedings outside the court and would have preferred 
to find a replacement for his stolen property. Under the prevailing circumstances, the two 
communities were looking for a reason to fight. The army intervened to quell the 
consequent riots.
79
 
A second instance was another Bakr-id riot in the lower Hooghly area, which also 
involved Hindu and Muslim migrants. On the day of the sacrifice, to retaliate the act, 
some chamars and dosadhs, low-caste upcountry Hindus, killed a pig within the premise 
of the mill.  The next day, the mill had a shortage of yarn which gave the workers a three 
hour break. During the break, the Muslims standing outside the mill asked the mill 
manager, “Who killed the pig?” Once they realized it was done by a group of Hindus on 
the same day as Bakr-Id, passions inflamed and Muslims refused to return to work until 
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the issue had been resolved and pig removed from the mill premises.
80
 They became 
angrier and disaffected that Hindus were allowed to sacrifice in the mill when they were 
disbarred from doing the same.  
The practice of eating beef within the Muslim community was rare. Most ate beef 
only once a year for Bakr-id. However, Muslims felt threatened by the revivalist Hindu 
rhetoric and reacted by defending their practice to sacrifice cow for their religious festival. 
Eating beef was not common in the villages, which is why local leaders were able to 
utilize its miniscule nature to emphasize the Hindu attack on Islamic traditions. In doing 
so, they created Muslim solidarity in the countryside that rarely existed in Bengal. It 
politicized the issue of cow killing by framing it in terms of a clash of religious ideology.  
A third case was the Talla riot, which transpired in Calcutta on 29 June, 1897 over 
a minor personal dispute. While the jute mill factories did not discriminate among its 
laborers, the politicization of the Hindu and Muslim rural communities during this decade 
had spilled over into the industrial Calcutta. The anger also spread deeper into the 
villages, sparking violence. The riot started with a land dispute between the Maharaja 
Jatindramohan Tagore and a tenant, Himmat Khan.
81
 The court gave Himmat Khan a 
notice of eviction because his hut was declared to be a mosque. The so called mosque 
was demolished by the police, which started the riot. As the riot spread through the 
surrounding lands of Talla, on the northern outskirts of Calcutta, the communal infighting 
did not abate until July 6
th
. Eighty-seven people were arrested on rioting charges and 81 
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of them were ultimately convicted.
82
 Reports depicted the event as one in which 
“hundreds of masons and coolies” fought with the police for two days.83  
Most of the people protesting were Muslims since they were fighting against the 
state on the issue of the demolition of a mosque. The protest politicized more Muslims. 
These riots were manifestations of a politically charged communal atmosphere. The three 
riots encapsulate how the workers from several mills were reacting to the increased 
religious awareness and communal tension. Their response demonstrated the workers’ 
conception of belonging to a larger community. The question whether or not the hut was 
actually a mosque or Himmat Khan’s house in the Talla riot was thus completely ignored 
in the process. Furthermore, it also illustrates the role of religious spaces and leaders for 
political mobilization. Muslims congregated at their local mosque for the Titaghur riot 
and an imam was heavily involved in connecting and collecting people from neighboring 
towns to rise against Hindu domination. The anjumans and the gauraksha Sabhas were 
crucial to precipitating the violence. Moreover, the British tried to maintain the status quo 
by desperately trying to avoid regulating cow slaughter. And their court decisions on each 
cow protection case only inflamed communal feeling since the defeated party rioted to 
protest the result of the trial.   
Despite their profession or place in the social structure of the colonial milieu, the 
Muslim mill hands shared a sense of identity that cross cuts into what Chakrabarty 
defines as “class,” the working class in the factories. Their communal connection 
generated hundreds and thousands workers from different places like Chitpur, Kashipur, 
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Branager, and Nikaripara to face a police force that was predominantly Hindu.
84
 The 
episode demonstrated the arousal of religious and communal consciousness. 
During Bakr-id, the issue of cow protection was explosive and it inflamed 
religious passions of both the Hindus and Muslims; and its ramifications of antagonistic 
communal relations also manifested in other areas. Muslims no longer attended open-air 
operas by Hindu performers because the enactments demonized the Muslims in the 
stories. They also stopped celebrating Durga Puja with the Hindus.
85
 In turn, the Hindus 
discontinued coming to the Muharram and collaborating with the Muslims in public 
events. Muslim tenants also refused to pay festival fees to the zamindar.
86
  
Other manifestations of peasant consciousness were increased observance of 
religious holidays. In Titaghur, Baranagar, Kamarhatty, Garden Reach, and Hooghly 
workers aggressively began to take holidays for religious celebrations, even threatening 
to go on strike if the authorities refused. In 1894-95, mills workers became extremely 
assertive about observing their religious festivals, including those of Id, Muharram, and 
Rath Jatra”.87 It was a display of the burgeoning religious identity among the lower 
classes. Sometimes the Indian Jute Manufacturing Association had to request additional 
police support in the jute-mill municipalities to maintain order among the raucous jute 
mill workers. There were other cases of tense confrontations stemming from boisterous 
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Hindu festival processions passing near Mosques during prayer time.
 88
 It became another 
recurring point of contention between the two communities.  
 
REMNANT COMMUNALISM AND ITS AFTERMATH 
Cow protection and cow sacrifice is an issue, Hindus and Muslims have laid down 
differences that are sharp in contrast. In Bengal, the violence over cow protection did not 
reach the same ferocity as it did in Punjab and the United Provinces. In India, the 
movement was at its height from 1888 to 1893, but the most intense riots in Bengal did 
not erupt until after 1894. From Punjab, the movement spread to the east, energized by 
the “Allahabad High Court’s decision that cow killing could not be prohibited merely on 
the grounds that the cow is an object of religious worship”.89 Hindus established 
gauraksha sabhas in Bengal largely because of the news of clashes coming from western 
India.  As in other areas, the cow protection support came from the zamindars. It was not 
a pan-Hindu phenomenon as it is proclaimed, and was skillfully utilized by certain caste 
elites to improve their social position. From the previous examples, we see that the most 
serious clashes over cow protection took place in the mofussil, with the zamindars, 
jotedars, and local religious associations who were frequently involved in the incidence. 
Furthermore, British attempts to codify the authentic place for cow killings and 
protection only exacerbated the problem, since each side claimed the custom to be on 
their side. It resulted in a private and local issue to spill over into the public arena, which 
became one of first steps to painting the issue in terms of a conflict between zamindars 
and raiyats by the anjuman.    
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These incidents and clashes created deep suspicion between the two communities. 
Succeeding disputes developed a communal narrative of distinct communities that would 
become dominant in the 20
th
 century, but was not prevalent yet. The anjumans and the 
gauraksha sabhas proactively made the situation worse by using religious differences to 
explain socio-economic grievances. The politicization of the cow-protection debate 
would never have reached such fiery heights without the activities of the sabhas and 
anjumans. The eruption of cow-controversy related violence effectively divided the 
people of Kushtia, along communal lines in 1897.  Hindu milkmen stopped delivering 
milk to the Muslims, and Hindu washermen and barbers refused to service Muslims.  Ibn 
Maazuddin discusses how tenant Muslims resisted their zamindars’ orders not to sacrifice 
cows with the help of the anjumans.
90
 As expected, the tension surrounding the issue 
reached a culminating point, during Bakr-id time, where police had to be called in to 
prevent violent outbreaks. That is, riots and clashes demonstrated and fomented hostile 
communal relations. 
Frequently, the peasants and factory workers have become involved in these 
conflicts, even if they were not directly affected. The government tried to rectify the 
situation by citing customs and innovative laws but implementing them stirred more 
trouble. Local officials mismanaged conflict instead of mediating it, which turned a bad 
situation worse. After the 1893 riots, Dr. Lethbridge, an official in the British 
Government, commented that these conflicts “make all combinations of Hindus and 
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Mahomedans impossible”.91 The government officials were also swept away by the 
communal hostilities. The magistrate of the 24 Parganas, E. W. Collin was critical of the 
Hindu police inspector for inadequately dealing with the Muslim unrest. The policemen 
in the Talla riots openly sided with the Hindu landlords because they were Hindu, 
enraging the Muslim rioters. 
In the earlier Talla riot, Bengal witnessed some fierce conflicts among jute-mill 
workers over religious affiliations. As a result, they encouraged communal solidarity. 
One of the first workers’ organizations was formed in 1895; it was called the Mahomedan 
Association, whose main purpose was to recruit more Muslims to jute mills and renovate 
mosques.
92
 Peasants were mobilizing along religious lines to counter mistreatment of 
labor in factories. Dipesh Chakrabarty demonstrates that during the cow protections 
movement elements of traditional religious relations were utilized to combat the new 
challenges of the industrial period.  
The cow protection movement and communal clashes, however sporadic, left a 
permanent mark on the rural identities of Bengal. The Bengali journal Navajug described 
the situation in 1901 as the Hindus “come across cases of cow-killing by particular 
Mussalmans, or by a particular Mussalman community, [they] hold the entire Mussalman 
population of the country responsible for the act… the Mussalmans, on their part, come 
to entertain a similar feeling against the Hindus”.93 It foretells of the new kind of 
communal politics that was emerging not only in Bengal, but in all over India. It was 
                                                 
91
 Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims, 178; Landowne Papers, Letters, Secretary of State, vol. V, January 
1893 to January 1894, Letter No. 53, from the Earl of Kimberley to Marquess of Lansdowne 25, 
August, 1893. 
92
 Chakrabarty, Rethinking Working-Class History, 191. 
93
 Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims, 178. 
 Alam 44 
 
undoubtedly a stepping stone to the more virulent uprisings and riots of the 20
th
 century. 
Ultimately, it shaped the historical discourse of the subcontinent.  
In the preceding argument, it has been “shown that cow-protection movement did 
not yet indicate a complete communal polarization of Bengali society… [but it] drew the 
lines between the two religious communities; these lines were further re-enforced by 
skillful manipulation of other available cultural symbols, such as language”.94 The Hindi-
Urdu controversy, which concluded in 1900 in favor of Hindi, was another explosive 
issue. However, it primarily affected the landed magnates and the professional classes, 
since they were competing for government positions in the United Provinces but not in 
Bengal. To the illiterate Bengali peasants, it was uncontroversial until the Muslim elites 
used the Urdu language, as a symbol of Islamic purity to arouse communal consciousness. 
However, their efforts had a meager effect.  
The politicization of both Hindu and Muslim identities during this period raised 
tensions and animosities, but it did not indicate communal inevitability. There were still 
plenty of voices calling for communal harmony. Despite explosive incidents, the cow 
protection movement in Bengal was confined to only certain parts of Bengal. With the 
majority of the riots occurring in the latter part of the decade in Bengal, it remained an 
episodic demonstration of communal tensions. In fact, between the years 1889 to 1894, 
there was only one recorded communal incident in all of Bengal, which happened in the 
Calcutta suburbs.
95
 Even though the cow protection movement portrayed the fragile 
nature of Hindu-Muslim relations, it did not irreparably impair the social fabric of the 
Bengali countryside. Communal clashes still remained a sporadic source of civil 
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disturbance, and an individual’s personal reputation still trumped over religious 
affiliation in elections.  In the first Bengal Legislative Council election in 1893, a Muslim 
lawyer named Maulvi Serajul Islam was elected in the Chittagong district “largely on 
Hindu votes”, and Surendranath Banerjea could not have won the seat for Calcutta 
Corporation without Muslim support.
96
 One senior police officer notes the general 
harmony among caste and racial groups, “Nothing strikes the intelligent traveler in India 
more forcibly than the friendly and peaceable attitude of all castes and classes towards 
each other”.97 However, the mutual distrust would resurface again in the wake of the 
swadeshi movement during the first partition of Bengal.  
Lord Curzon, who became the Viceroy of British India in 1899, decided to 
vivisect the Bengal presidency in 1905, which sparked the potency of communalism in 
Bengal anew. The population of the presidency had surpassed 78 million and it was 
becoming increasingly cumbersome to govern.
98
 Curzon combined Assam in the east 
with East Bengal to make one province and fused Orissa, Bihar and a few districts of 
Central Provinces with Bengal to create another province. The reasoning was that the 
Bengal province had become much too big for efficient administration. The new 
provinces after the partition caused a major demographic shift changing the political 
balance of the region. East Bengal and Assam, with a population of 31 million became a 
muslim operated province, with Dhaka as its capital; Bengal comprised of some 50 
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million people was still a Hindu majority region, but was no longer a region dominated 
by Bengalis.
99
  
Hindu nationalists claimed it was a deliberate attempt by the British to divide and 
rule Bengal, and this notion would not be tolerated by Hindu’s. Therefore, they launched 
a protest movement called swadeshi, where people boycotted foreign manufactured 
products from shoes to cigarettes. The song Bande Mataram written by Bankimchandra 
was set to tune by Rabrindranath Tagore, and it became a rallying cry for nationalist 
fervor.
100
 The political leadership of the swadeshi movement was led by Hindu 
Bhadraloks. The strong emphasis on Hindu symbols in the swadeshi movement was 
another point of division between the Hindus and Muslims. The Hindu domination in the 
leadership  with the glorification of the Hindu goddess Kali  and the infusion of Bande 
Mataram, an overtly Hindu song, to the movement estranged the Muslims once again. In 
the beginning, the Muslim leaders were not supportive of the partition idea but they 
increasingly saw the advantages of having a separate province. After partition, East 
Bengal and Assam became a Muslim majority province.
101
  
Parition gave the Muslim leaders aspirations of better educational and 
employment opportunities and greater voice in economic and political decisions 
favorable towards Muslims. There was always a looming suspicion that the swadeshi 
movement and the protest efforts were a culmination of the landed interests from west 
Bengal. For Bengali Muslims, the partition was a blessing because it presented the 
                                                 
99
 Barbara and Thomas Metcalf,  A Concise History of Modern India (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 156. 
100
 Metcalf, A Concise History, 156. 
101
 Metcalf, A Concise History, 159. 
 Alam 47 
 
opportunity for empowering the Muslim community. The partition brought elite interests 
into the countryside yet again and created tensions between the Hindus and Muslims, 
exacerbating communal hostilities once more. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The discourse in modern South Asian history is dominated by the dichotomy of 
Hindu-Muslim relations. Through a detailed examination of the cow protection 
movement, I show in this paper that the notion of Hindu-Muslim communalism was a 
discursive formation. It was a combination of religious revivalism, the effects of British 
legal system and census operations, and interests of local and urban elites in the political 
sector of the countryside that insured the widespread communal impact of the cow 
protection movement. It brought a new kind of politics in rural Bengal, one infused with 
religious dogmatism and nationalism.  
However, the cow protection movement did not exhibit the ferocity of communal 
violence that was displayed in Punjab and the United Provinces. In Bengal, it 
demonstrated sporadic surges of communal politics. The 1890’s were merely a time when 
glimpses of the communal violence could be observed and the formation of the Hindus 
and Muslims were becoming politicized as social categories. Throughout the colonial 
period, rural identities were still based on “primal and traditional sources such as religion, 
language, and ethnicity”.102 The communal question transformed into an adversarial 
relationship between the Hindus and Muslims because of the politicization of religious 
identities. The anjumans and the sabhas became the new social centers of the countryside 
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where once fluid religious categories of Hindu and Muslim were codified. The British 
Census operations were vital to codifying Hindu and Muslim social categories that 
dominated politics in the 20
th
 century. 
The communal hostilities between Hindus and Muslims, when contextualized in 
the larger history of South Asia, depict a very different image. During the latter part of 
the Mughal era, there were fierce animosities between Sannyasi orders and the Vairagis. 
Literate and highly organized, these religious sects were traders. They competed for 
Mughal “state patronage or for control over commercial rights”.103 Their hostilities were 
grounded in not only religion, but also in economic concerns. By the end of the 19
th
 
century, Muslims appealed to the British for preferential treatment within education and 
administration. Their efforts resulted in the formation of a pan-Muslim social category in 
South Asia. Similarly, Hindus attempted to mobilize various caste groups in order to 
demonstrate their demographic power. In doing so, they hoped to convince the British 
administration to allow them to participate in political decision-making. Corresponding 
with historical patterns, the elite pressure groups implemented a facile plan to draw 
distinctions among religious groups for economic concessions. 
Mughal rulers, Babar and Akbar, impressed protection of the sacred animal, the 
cow, by banning its slaughter. During the Sepoy Mutiny, the king of Delhi outlawed cow 
slaughter for Hindu-Muslim amity and unity.
104
 As demonstrated here, the history of 
Hindu-Muslim relations does in fact reflect instances of communal solidarity through the 
cow. The political conditions and power relations of that time demanded and shaped the 
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relationships among communities. In the late 19
th
 century, the politics of Bengal and 
India, in general, were evolving in a way that was re-formulating the identities of people 
along religious and communal lines.  
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